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Abstract It is argued that the problems affecting our societies at present are not so
much the result of a mysterious disappearance of inventiveness and imagination, as
Phelps deplores. It is rather the dramatic change of the socio-economic order pro-
pelled by the neoliberal ideology that captured the minds of many people and
politicians. This led to a de-regulation of financial markets and a policy of austerity,
which triggered the ‘‘Great Recession’’ and stifled innovation. There is also the
problem of a mismatch between our measurement devices and what is to be measured
in a world of bits and bytes. With the firm establishment and growth of R&D&I in all
Western economies the talk about a declining innovativeness ought to be received
with suspicion. Newmaterials and rare earths, biotechnology, further advances in ICT
and what is called the fourth industrial revolution based on cyber-physical systems
can be expected to have an important impact on economic performance.
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1 Introduction
In a paper published in the New York Review of Books (2015, vol. 6, no. 13),
reprinted as Phelps (2016) in Homo Oeconomicus, Edmund Phelps asks: ‘‘What is
wrong with the economies of the West—and with economics?’’ and adds: ‘‘It
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depends on whether we are talking about the good or the just’’ (p. 1). I surmise
instead that it depends first and foremost on which kind of economics we are talking
about and partly also about which economies of the West. Phelps appears to imply
that there is only one kind of economics, not several, and that Western economies all
exhibit largely the same performance. Yet, while there is a mainstream in
economics, there is clearly no unite´ de doctrine, and while there are parallels among
several Western economies, there is no unite´ de de´veloppement. Is Phelps’ view
stricken by a lack of differentiation both on a theoretical and an empirical level?
Phelps deplores that ‘‘Our prevailing political economy is blind to the very
concept of inclusion; it does not map out any remedy for the deficiency’’ (p. 4). By
this he means that today’s economics is exclusively concerned with ‘‘consuming
goods and having leisure’’ and disregards the fact that ‘‘many people have long felt
the desire to do something with their lives’’ above and beyond what economists
argue they are doing. This is only partly true, and exceptions could easily be
invoked. But I am not so much interested in this issue as in what or whom he blames
for the neglect, that is, ‘‘classical economics,’’ which is said to be concerned with a
rather ‘‘pitiful sort of economy’’ (p. 6). ‘‘In the classical model,’’ he opines, ‘‘no one
is trying to think up something new… and no one is attempting to create it.… The
economy is mechanical, robotic. The crops may be growing, but there is no personal
growth.’’ (p. 7). Surprisingly, he takes Joseph A. Schumpeter as a representative of
this view: ‘‘Joseph Schumpeter portrays ‘innovation’ as produced by hard-driving
entrepreneurs who make ‘obvious’ applications of discoveries occurring outside the
nation’s economy—as if the economy’s central participants possessed no imagi-
nation whatever’’ (p. 7). Phelps concludes: ‘‘Such classical models are basic to
today’s standard economics. This economics, despite its sophistication in some
respects, makes no room for economies in which people are imagining new products
and using their creativity to build them. What is most fundamentally ‘wrong with
economics’ is that it takes such an economy to be the norm—to be ‘as good as it
gets.’ The cost is that elements of the Western economies are becoming products of
this basically classical economics, which has little place for creativity and
imagination’’ (p. 7).
These statements I find difficult to sustain. The idea that economies are shaped in
the image of what some economists think they are, appears to me to strongly
exaggerate the importance of the latter. (I will talk about exceptions to this below.)
Economists are able to capture the minds of some people, and the policies they
recommend, if realized, do have real effects. But not infrequently these effects raise
doubts about the correctness of the economic analysis underlying the policy. Had
(mainstream) economists managed to shape the economy according to their views of
it, such discrepancies between expected and actual effects of a policy should have
become more and more narrow. This, however, does not seem to be the case.
More important from the perspective taken in this note, Phelps portrays
‘‘classical’’ and ‘‘Schumpeterian’’ economics in a way that amounts to a travesty of
facts. In this note I indicate in which respects I think his account is misleading, and
why, and what in my view provides a better perspective on some of the important
issues raised by him. Section 2 deals critically with his concept of ‘‘classical
economics’’ and Sect. 3 with his view of ‘‘Schumpeterian economics’’. Section 4
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has a glance at the empirical evidence and the question of whether the received
measurement devices at our disposal are appropriate in regard to the novel
phenomena we are confronted with. Section 5 concludes.
2 Classical Economics on Development and Growth
Has Phelps fallen victim to John Maynard Keynes’ misleading concept of ‘‘classical
economics’’ in The General Theory (Keynes 1936)? Keynes’ knowledge of the
writings of Smith and Ricardo was poor; he relied essentially on the judgement
Marshall had passed on them in the Principles, interpreting them as precursors of
the marginalist doctrine. Indeed, Keynes’ points of reference were essentially
representatives of the neoclassical doctrine: Alfred Marshall and Arthur Cecil
Pigou. These had advocated ‘‘Say’s law’’ according to which every act of saving
will swiftly lead to an act of investment of the same magnitude, so that aggregate
effective demand can never persistently constrain output as a whole and
employment. Since Ricardo in his controversy with Malthus about the impossibility
of a ‘‘general glut’’ of commodities also insisted that acts of saving (and thus
leakages of effective demand) will be met by acts of investment (and thus injections
of effective demand), Keynes took Ricardo to imply that the economic system
incessantly tends towards, or gravitates around, the full employment of labour.
Alas, things are invariably more complicated. In the classical economists ‘‘Say’s
law’’ was meant to apply to capitalistically produced commodities only, and thus
not to labour power, which is not so produced. Therefore, the alleged ‘‘law’’ did not
apply to what was later called the ‘‘labour market’’, a concept elaborated by the
marginalist authors, who subsumed this market under the ‘‘law’’ (see Kurz 2016).
Keynes’ focus on the employment issue made him confound the two different
concepts of the law and also made him ignore a fundamental difference between the
classical and the marginalist approaches to the theory of value and distribution. As
Keynes’ younger colleague Piero Sraffa, whom he respected a great deal, showed,
the classical economists did not treat wages and profits symmetrically in terms of
the demand for and supply of a factor ‘‘labour’’ and a factor ‘‘capital’’. In the theory
of value and distribution they rather took the real wage rate (or the share of wages)
as given and determined the rate (and share) of profits residually in terms of the
‘‘surplus product’’ left after all used up means of production and the real wages in
the support of workers had been deducted from gross output levels. (They
determined the level of wages in another part of their analyses—the part concerned
with capital accumulation, population growth, the scarcity of natural resources and
different forms of technical progress.) This surplus theory of profits determines the
rate of profits in a given place and at a given time in terms of given output levels and
given wages. Competitive conditions force agents to behave in a cost-minimizing
way and make them choose methods of production from among available
alternatives that maximize the general rate of profits. A higher (lower) level of
real wages typically changes the technique chosen and implies a lower (higher) rate
of profits. This is Ricardo’s fundamental ‘‘law of distribution’’.
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In this perspective workers and the proprietors of ‘‘capital’’ are not paid the
marginal products of the respective factor services, not least because typically there
are no smooth opportunities of substitution among them. More importantly, it is
even unclear what ‘‘substitution’’ between ‘‘capital’’ and labour means vis-a`-vis the
heterogeneity of capital goods. Clearly, in long-period analysis, every atom of
‘‘capital’’ yields the same rate of profits, but since capital in whichever line of
production typically consists of a set of various concrete capital goods, capital can
only be conceptualised as a value magnitude, not as a physical one like labour of a
particular skill or land of a particular quality. But what is the marginal product of a
‘‘little more’’ value capital, ceteris paribus? We may also ask: on what grounds can
it be said that a larger rate of profits corresponding to a lower real wage rate is more
(less) ‘‘just’’ than a lower rate of profits corresponding to a larger real wage rate?
Clearly, one class would be better off to the detriment of some other class(es), but
what is the general metric of justice that would allow one to assess changes in
income (or wealth distribution)?
In the classical economists we do not encounter such a metric. What we
encounter instead is their pronounced concern with economic development and the
distribution of the fruits of economic growth. Adam Smith cared for the
participation of the ‘‘labouring poor’’ in the wealth of a nation and therefore
focused attention on capital accumulation and an ever deeper division of labour,
which was seen to be accompanied by technical and organizational improvements
and a rising labour productivity. The larger the rate of capital accumulation, the
more rapid the growth of markets, the greater the scope for a further deepening of
the division of labour, the quicker the growth in labour productivity, the higher the
rate of profits spurring further capital accumulation, the more rapid the increase in
the demand for hands, which, for a given reproductive behaviour, will result in an
upward trend of real wages. This is the essence of Smith’s doctrine of the
unintended consequences of selfishness: capitalists, seeking to increase profits,
trigger a socio-economic process that turns out to be beneficial also to workers in
terms of a trickling down of the rising wealth of a nation to the lower classes of
society. Smith makes it very clear that self-seeking behaviour generates (net)
positive externalities only in a society that is well governed and that restrains as
much as possible the dark sides of selfishness in terms of a country’s constitution, its
laws, institutions and regulatory framework. Not for nothing he spoke of political
economy as perhaps the most important branch of the ‘‘science of the legislator’’,
because it is meant to instruct the legislator about which commandments,
prohibitions, norms and incentives can further the well-being of society at large.
From a Smithian perspective one may thus say that some of the difficulties that
currently beset Western societies is to a considerable degree due to the perforation
of the ‘‘protective belt’’ against socially harmful behaviour and schemes especially
in financial markets. It is a consequence of deregulatory measures implemented
under the spell of the neoliberal ideology. The effect was a dramatic increase in
systemic risks. Sadly enough, in response to the financial turmoil and its
implications for the real economy the protective belt has not been strengthened
again to be able to successfully ward off the dangers associated with ‘‘financial
innovations’’ that benefit the few to the detriment of the many. Smith stressed: ‘‘The
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obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a
violation of natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the
banking trade which are here proposed’’ (WN II.ii.94).
Deregulation and financial innovations have brought about a banking system that
is predominantly concerned with making profits in short-term financial transactions
and no longer in financing long-term profitable investments. By paying huge salaries
and bonuses to employees in the financial business, many bright young people have
been prevented from seeking jobs in more productive sectors of the economy. Partly
stimulated by governments, banks have channelled huge amounts of money
unproductively into the housing and real estate sector, generating a huge bubble
there. Under the impression of the slump and the failure of many firms to pay back
their debts and of bankruptcies, banks and financial agencies are reluctant to provide
credit for new firms and start-ups, which reduces the overall rate of innovation and
decelerates the diffusion of new technologies in the economic system. It is my
impression that Phelps underestimates the negative and lasting effects of the
‘‘neoliberal’’ ideology that has conquered large parts of economics like the Holy
Inquisition had conquered Spain, to use Keynes’ famous phrase (see Kurz 2010).
A key concept in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is what we nowadays call
‘‘dynamically increasing returns to scale’’ that are endogenous to the economy as a
whole, and not just to single firms. Such an economy can hardly be called
‘‘mechanical, robotic’’.What Phelps appears to have inmind when speaking about the
‘‘classical’’ economists are in fact the marginalist or neoclassical ones, with Marshall
and his Newton-inspired view of the economic world as one of its major spokesmen.1
Contrary to Phelps’ contention, Smith made ‘‘room for economies in which
people are imagining new products and using their creativity to build them.’’ In a
famous passage the Scotsman stressed:
Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the
machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and
some by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation,
whose trade it is, not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who,
upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the
most distant and dissimilar objects. In the progress of society, philosophy or
speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade
and occupation of a particular class of citizens. (Smith 1976b,WN I.i.9;
emphasis added)
Philosophy or speculation, i.e., science, percolates ever-more modern society and
becomes the foundation of its material metabolism and surplus creation. Almost a
quarter of a millennium prior to the invention of the term ‘‘knowledge society’’
Smith insisted that ‘‘the quantity of science’’ available to a society decides its
1 It deserves to be noted, however, that Marshall cannot be reduced only to this vision. He actually wrote
that ‘‘the Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics,’’ with
‘‘dynamics’’ in this case denoting an approach more mechanistic (in the sense of Newton’s astronomy)
than evolutionary. If the ‘‘evolutionist’’ aspect of Marshall’s work does not come up for discussion in
much of economics, this is because today’s mainstream economics sees the mechanical—not the
biological—as of paramount importance.
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members’ productivity and wealth (WN I.i.9). It is not so much the ingenuity and
creativity of single individuals that matters, as Phelps seems to imply, it is an entire
industry—R&D&I: Research, Development and Innovation—that takes on the task
of incessantly revolutionizing the methods of production and the world of
commodities. An important concept in this regard is ‘‘systems of innovation’’ at
the regional, national and international level—networks of scholars, engineers,
technicians and firms, and their collaboration. With the establishment and growth of
such a ‘‘trade’’, the process of generating ‘‘improvements’’ and innovations has been
put on a firm basis and has become organised, systematic, market-oriented and
sustainable. Smith deserves credit for having sensed the emergence of such a trade
as early as the threshold of the Industrial Revolution.
It is interesting to note that Smith uses the combinatory metaphor to describe
novelty: new economically useful knowledge derives from the combination of
reconfigured bits of known particles of knowledge—a definition, which involves the
path dependency of progress in knowledge. Interestingly, Schumpeter (1912) and
several other economists after him adopted the metaphor; see most recently
Weitzman (1998).
Phelps deplores that ‘‘In most of Western Europe, economic dynamism is now at
lows not seen, I would judge, since the advent of dynamism in the nineteenth
century. Imagining and creating new products has almost disappeared from the
continent’’. He adds: ‘‘Growth there has stopped, and econometric estimates of the
rate of homegrown innovation are generally small. The near disappearance of
imaginative and creative activity has reduced indigenous innovation, contracted
investment activity, and depressed the demand for labor’’ (p. 7). In view of the firm
establishment and absolute and relative growth of the R&D&I sector in Western
Europe, this assessment ought to be received with suspicion. Phelps appears to
allude to Robert J. Gordon’s finding within conventional growth accounting that the
annual growth rate of total factor productivity has declined from ‘‘abnormal’’
heights in the 1950s to long-run normal levels in recent decades. The question,
however, is what we actually see, to use Phelps’ term, and what we don’t,
employing the received devices of measuring economic performance. There is
reason to presume that our measurement techniques, while tailored to a world of
corn and iron, are bound to fare badly in a world of bits and bytes. Therefore, one
ought to beware of premature judgements.
In a recent note, growth economist Paul Romer (2015) chastised many of his
colleagues who are said to be still convinced to be able to treat scale effects due to
nonrival ideas (such as new industrial devices) in terms of conventional Marshallian
economics with the attention on price taking in perfectly competitive markets. He
calls these people ‘‘traditionalists’’ and describes the challenge, as he sees it, which
growth economics faces, as consisting of the following:
For the last two decades, growth theory has made no scientific progress toward
a consensus. The challenge is how to model the scale effects introduced by
nonrival ideas. Mobile telephony is the update to the pin factory, the
demonstration that scale effects are too important to ignore. To accommodate
them, many growth theorists have embraced monopolistic competition, but an
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influential group of traditionalists continues to support price taking with
external increasing returns. (Romer 2015: 89)
The ‘‘pin factory’’ is, of course, a reference to Adam Smith’s discussion of the
division of labour and the scale effects that come with it. It is indeed a (frequently
unconscious) return to the classical perspective on economic development and
growth and an abandonment of the marginalist or neoclassical one that is
characteristic feature of some of the contributions to what had been dubbed ‘‘new’’
or ‘‘endogenous’’ growth theory (see Kurz and Salvadori 1998). Unfortunately, the
new perspective was embedded in an old analytical framework using macroeco-
nomic production functions, as if genuine novelty and qualitative change could be
represented by quantitative change, i.e., ever more of the same stuff.2 A
characteristic feature of the process of modernization and socio-economic
development is thus not captured at all: the fact that the cosmos of commodities
is growing all the time, because the number of newly invented commodities exceeds
that of displaced ones: we are confronted with an increasing heterogeneity of goods,
means of production, types of labour etc. How could a one-good model possibly tell
us something interesting about it?
Finally, a brief comment is apposite on Phelps’ treatment of ‘‘imagination’’ as
something that is invariably good, a universal blessing, like ‘‘creativity’’. In the
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1976a) dealt with imagination inter alia
in the context of a discussion of ‘‘deception’’ and sees it as ambiguous from a moral
point of view. He wrote: ‘‘The pleasure of wealth and greatness, when considered in
this complex view, strike the imagination as something grand, and beautiful, and
noble, of which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so
apt to bestow upon it.’’ He added:
And it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception
which arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. It is this
which first prompted them … to invent and improve all the sciences and arts,
which ennoble and embellish human life; which have entirely changed the
whole face of the globe … (TMS: 303)
However, Smith insisted, certain ‘‘passions arise altogether from the imagina-
tion’’ (TMS: 78). Creativity and imagination, he stressed, can also be put at the
service of evil motives. The continuing turbulences in the financial sector are to no
small degree the result of new financial instruments, some of which appear to have
been invented in order to fool ill-informed people. ‘‘Mean people’’, Smith stressed,
can be expected to ruthlessly exploit the situation.
2 After having found out that one of his earlier formalisations of growth theory were incompatible with
the nonrivalry of new industrial devices (new methods of production, etc.), Romer belittled his blunder by
emphasizing that ‘‘it may seem a trifling matter in an area of theory that depends on so many other short
cuts. After all, if one is going to do violence to the complexity of economic activity by assuming that
there is an aggregate production function, how much more harm can it do to be sloppy about the
difference between rival and nonrival goods?’’ (Romer 1994: 15–16) The answer clearly is that one ought
to refrain from assuming a macroeconomic production function, which has never been shown to be the
result of consistent aggregation across micro units of production.
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Such asymmetries permeate the Wealth of Nations and apply to large groups of
people and even to entire classes of society. The worker is most in danger of being
manipulated, Smith insists. Upon particular occasions his ‘‘clamour is animated, set
on, and supported by his employers, not for his, but their own particular
purposes‘‘(WN I.xi.p.9). Merchants and master manufacturers are said to be
possessed of a ‘‘superior knowledge of their own interest’’, which ‘‘is never exactly
the same with that of the publick’’; and who ‘‘have generally an interest to deceive
and even to oppress the publick, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions,
both deceived and oppressed it.’’ (WN I.xi.p.10)
The massive change in the distribution of income and wealth reported by Tony
Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and others can be interpreted in Smithian terms as
reflecting to a considerable extent the impact of a change in economic policy, the
tax system, social institutions and the incentive structure consequent upon the
neoliberal campaign. With regard to the policy recommendations coming from
business and moneyed men, Smith had warned, these ‘‘ought always to be listened
to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long
and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most
suspicious attention’’ (WN I.xi.p.10). Alas, his warnings had not been taken
seriously, and there are no signs that things have changed much since 2007. The
neoliberal ideology has captured the minds of many people and is still predominant
amongst politicians.
3 Schumpeter and ‘‘Creative Destruction’’
The picture Phelps draws of Schumpeter I find particularly unsatisfactory. I am
almost inclined to say that the exact opposite of what he writes about the author of
the Theory of Economic Development, first published in German in 1912, comes
closer to the truth. A quick summary of Schumpeter’s ideas is apposite.
The Austrian economist chooses Sir Isaac Newton’s ‘‘Hypotheses non fingo’’ as
the motto of his book. By this he wishes to say that he does not put forward
hypotheses, but well-founded propositions. These are designed to complement
Walras’ theory of the circular flow by a dynamic theory of socio-economic
development. In this way he seeks to overcome the ‘‘sea of darkness’’ that hides the
law of motion of the capitalist economy from our eyes. Like the hero in his book,
the entrepreneur, Schumpeter is an innovator whose work involves ‘‘creative
destruction’’. He demolishes received ideas and theories, including those of some of
his Viennese teachers. Walras’ theory, he opines, is useful in understanding the
hypothetical stationary state, but not the real world: innovations, the ‘‘realisation of
new combinations’’—are ‘‘the overwhelming fact in the economic history of the
capitalist society’’ (1912: 159). Ironically, Schumpeter levelled the same kind of
criticism at Walras that Phelps levels at Schumpeter. In fact, while conventional
marginalist (neoclassical, Walrasian) theory is concerned with homo oeconomicus,
anxious to optimally adjust to given circumstances (constraints), Schumpeter is
concerned with homo faber, homo laborans or homo innovativus, incessantly
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seeking to overcome existing limitations and removing barriers in terms of new
goods, new methods of production, new forms of organizing firms and so on.
Two aspects of Schumpeter’s theory are of particular importance vis-a`-vis
Phelps’ argument. The first concerns Schumpeter’s conviction from the second
(revised and abridged) edition of the Theory of Economic Development ([1926]
1934) onwards, and echoing ideas of the Russian economist Michal Tugan-
Baranovsky and Schumpeter’s fatherly friend Arthur Spiethoff, that there are long
waves of economic development. Each of these is taken to be lasting for about
50 years, triggered by what were later called ‘‘basic innovations’’ or, more recently,
‘‘general purpose technologies’’. In contrast to incremental innovations they are
non-incremental and tend to revolutionize the entire economy. According to some
interpreters, many Western economies are currently experiencing the end of such a
long wave. What from the Schumpeterian point of view is a phase in the normal
development of the capitalist economy, with an upswing lurking around the corner,
Phelps takes to be a sign of its secular decline. It would be interesting to know what
he finds wrong with the Schumpeterian view.
The second aspect concerns the fact emphasized by Schumpeter that while the
financial sector is of the utmost importance to the financing of investment needed in
order to realize innovations, economic downturns may be aggravated and prolonged
because of the instability of the finance industry. After the ball is over, so to speak,
banks don’t trust lenders and would-be lenders anymore and are unwilling to grant
credits and finance investments. This stifles innovations and decelerates the rate of
growth of productivity. Firms in many Western European countries currently
experience banks’ reticence to provide liquidity. With the ‘‘head quarter of the
capitalist economy’’, as Schumpeter (1912: 276) called it, being paralyzed, so is the
economy as a whole. Since with the hypertrophic growth of the financial sector and
the huge profits that could be made there, also banks’ attitude and the skills of their
employees have changed. Many bankers have lost the capacity to form solid
judgements on investment projects submitted to them, because they lack expert
knowledge and a long-run orientation. They have become first and foremost
speculators on financial markets and are no longer concerned with long-term
productive investments. This appears to me to be a main problem at present.
Phelps asks the important question, whether economic development implies
‘‘progress’’—a question that already bothered Schumpeter quite a bit. Schumpeter
abstains from a definitive judgement and stresses that ‘‘Whether development leads
to social wellbeing or social misery is decided by its concrete content.’’ (1912: 492)
In his view the ‘‘deepest sense’’ of development consists in providing new qualities
and quantities of goods, which the capitalist machinery accomplishes most
impressively. However, the unintended political, ecological, cultural and so on
consequences of this success must not be underrated: they do have the power of
pushing the system socially and culturally in new and possibly not very agreeable
directions.
Both Smith and Schumpeter emphasized the institutional setup within which
human action takes place. Institutions define the rules of the game in society and
shape the incentive structure faced by economic agents. Does this structure favour
productive activities that promote individual and social wellbeing or does it
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encourage unproductive ones, rent-seeking and the like, that favours a few
individuals or groups to the detriment of the large majority? Does it lead to social
conflicts, erode fairness and trust and promote corruption? In my view the change in
income and wealth distribution constitutes a major threat to the foundations of civic
society: the amassment of economic and political power in a few hands undermines
democracy and meritocracy and leads us back to quasi-feudal and patrimonial
conditions. If economic power gets more and more concentrated, an irreconcilable
contradiction obtains between the democratic logic of ‘‘one voter one vote’’ and the
market logic of ‘‘one Dollar one vote.’’
Globalization has benefited those who are possessed of resources (capital, skills
etc.) and can participate in international markets to the detriment of those who
cannot. By dismantling the welfare state and implementing a policy of austerity in
the EU the lot of the losers of globalization has been further aggravated. This could,
in principle, have been grist to the mills of the political left, but with a few
exceptions it was not—neither in Europe nor in the United States, with a Republican
candidate for presidency that gives rise to worst fears. In Europe the problem of
mass migration triggered by the war President Bush junior had irresponsibly waged
on Iraq and the consequent destabilization of the entire middle east has led to a shift
in public discussion away from the distributive effects of globalization to the
alleged ‘‘threat’’ posed by Syrian, Iraqi and other refugees. This played into the
hands not of the political left, but the right, with nationalist and populist tendencies
endangering the survival of the open society and the European project and
deepening divisions within and between nations. These appear to me to be the real
problems we are facing at present. The issue of ‘‘inclusion’’ ought to be seen in this
context.
4 Facts, Figures and the Future
In this section I first provide some graphs showing the growth of labour and capital
productivity in several countries for the manufacturing sector in the period
1995–2007 and for the economy as a whole in the period 1980–2011.3 Compared to
the services sector the measurement problem in the manufacturing sector is arguably
a great deal less serious.
Figure 1 shows that, with the exception of France, the growth rate of labour
productivity in all countries covered does not exhibit a downward trend. In the
majority of countries—China, USA, Great Britain, Germany and Japan—the trend
was rather persistently and strongly upwards, while in Austria and Italy it was first
slightly downwards and then slightly upwards again. The high and accelerating
growth of labour productivity in China reflects the catching-up process that is taking
place there. What is remarkable, however, is that in several major highly developed
economies the growth of labour productivity increased and in several cases more
than doubled, from around 2 per cent per year to 4, 5 or even 6 per cent. There are
3 I am grateful to Marlies Schu¨tz for having prepared the graphs.
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no signs of a deceleration of productivity growth in the manufacturing sector—no
signs of a tendency towards stagnation in productivity terms.
When we turn to the development of capital productivity, the following picture
emerges (see Fig. 2). While in several countries capital productivity fell at the
beginning of the period of observation and in Japan even until around 2005, in all
countries, again with the exception of France, the trend of capital productivity was
persistently upwards. In France the growth rate of capital productivity came down
from about 4 per cent to zero.
The manufacturing sector thus shows no signs of a slackening of its technological
dynamism—on the contrary. While technical progress in all countries was labour
saving throughout the period under consideration, and in many countries at an
accelerating speed, the overall trend was also capital saving at an accelerating
speed.
Fig. 1 Labour productivity growth in manufacturing
Fig. 2 Capital productivity growth in manufacturing
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When we turn to the economy as a whole, the picture changes. Figure 3 plots the
development of total labour productivity during the much longer period of
1980–2011. Several countries (Austria, Italy, USA, Germany) exhibit first an
upward trend, which peaks at different points in time after 1990, and then turns
downward. An exception is catching-up China, where the level of labour
productivity growth is very high and the trend dominantly upwards. In Japan and
Great Britain the trend is dominantly downwards, in Great Britain even more so
than in Japan. A cursory glance at the diagram might be taken to support the idea
that several countries are in the final phase of a long wave of economic
development, with the 1980s and early 1990s showing parts of the upswing phase
and the time thereafter the downswing phase. The question, however, is whether our
measurement devices provide us with a sufficiently accurate picture of what is
happening or are seriously misleading as several economists emphasize. In the case
in which these devices are unable to capture the situation after the second digital
revolution and systematically underrate outputs and partly also inputs, any
nervousness about actual economic trends appears to be misplaced: it should rather
be directed at the way we measure and how our statistics are compiled. The question
is: Do we systematically underrate the magnitude giving the numerator in the
expression of overall labour productivity and perhaps also the denominator? And if
we had better measurement devices, what would we see?
Figure 4 gives the growth rate of overall capital productivity. The interesting fact
here is that for many countries (Germany, Japan, France, Italy, Austria) and for most
of the years under consideration capital productivity decreased, which means that
the overall capital-output ratio increased. The inverse of the capital-output ratio is
what may be called the maximum rate of profits, that is, the rate corresponding to
hypothetically zero wages.
The kind of technical change that gives rise to a falling maximum rate of profits
was first discussed by David Ricardo (1951) in the famous chapter ‘‘On Machin-
ery’’, published in the third edition of his Principles of Political Economy, as an
important possibility. In his ‘‘law’’ of the tendency of the rate of profits to fall Marx
Fig. 3 Labour productivity growth in the economy as a whole
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contended that this form of technical progress can be expected to dominate capitalist
development, because it is congenial to the capitalist mode of production. His
reasoning was not conclusive and has given rise to heated controversies that need
not concern us here. It suffices to point out that several studies in more recent times
insisted that the past few decades exhibited what was called ‘‘Marx-based technical
progress’’ (see, for example, Foley and Marquetti 2002), reflected in a growing
labour productivity and a rising capital-output ratio. Such a constellation is also at
the centre of Piketty’s recent book (2014).
The statistics displayed in the above provide a varied picture of the development
in several countries. Do they support Phelps’ contention of a vanishing dynamism of
Western economies? I wonder.
5 Concluding Remarks
It has been argued in this note that the problems affecting our societies and
economies at present are not so much the result of a mysterious disappearance of
inventiveness and imagination of the people in developed Western economies, as
Phelps deplores. It is rather the dramatic change of the socio-economic order
propelled by the neoliberal ideology war that managed to capture the minds of many
people and dominated politics in basically all capitalist countries. This led to a de-
regulation of financial markets that was partly responsible for the ‘‘great recession’’
and the stifling of innovative activities. But there is also the problem of a mismatch
between our measurement devices and what is to be measured in a world of bits and
bytes. There is reason to presume that the conventional devices tend to
underestimate what is going on in terms of productivity increases. Finally, given
the firm establishment and growth of an R&D&I industry in all Western economies
the talk about a declining innovativeness ought to be received with suspicion. New
materials and rare earths, biotechnology, further advances in ICT and what is called
Fig. 4 Capital productivity growth in the economy as a whole
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the fourth industrial revolution based on cyber-physical systems can be expected to
have important impacts on the world in which we live.
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